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Abstract
Web sites are routinely visited by automated agents
known as Web robots, that perform acts ranging from the
benecial, such as indexingfor search engines, to the ma-
licious, such as searching for vulnerabilities, attempting
to crack passwords, or spamming bulletin boards. Previ-
ous work to identifymalicious robotshas relied on ad-hoc
signature matching and has been performed on a per-site
basis. As Web robots evolve and diversify, these tech-
niques have not been scaling.
We approach the problem as a special form of the Tur-
ing test and defend the system by inferring if the traf-
c source is human or robot. By extracting the implicit
patterns of human Web browsing, we develop simple
yet effective algorithms to detect human users. Our ex-
periments with the CoDeeN content distribution network
showthat 95%of humanusers aredetectedwithin therst
57requests, and80%canbeidentiedinonly20requests,
with a maximum false positive rate of 2.4%. In the time
that this system has been deployed on CoDeeN, robot-
related abuse complaints have dropped by a factor of 10.
1 Introduction
Internet robots (or bots) are automated agents or scripts
that perform specic tasks without the continuous in-
volvement of human operators. The enormous growth
of the Web has made Internet bots indispensable tools
for various tasks, such as crawling Web sites to popu-
late search engines, or performing repetitive tasks such
as checking the validity of URL links.
Unfortunately, malicious users also use robots for var-
ious tasks, including (1) harnessing hundreds or thou-
sands of compromised machines (zombies) to ood Web
sites with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks,
(2) sending requests with forged referrer headers to au-
tomatically create trackback links that inate a site's
search engine rankings, (3) generating automated click-
throughs on online ads to boost afliate revenue, (4) har-
vesting e-mail addresses for future spamming, and (5)
testingvulnerabilitiesinservers, CGI scripts, etc., to com-
promise machines for other uses.
In this paper, we describe our techniques for automat-
ically identifying human-generated Web trafc and sep-
arating it from robot-generated trafc. With this infor-
mation, we can implement a number of policies, such
as rate-limiting robot trafc, providing differentiated ser-
vices, or restricting accesses. Such identication can help
protectindividualWeb sites, reducetheabuseexperienced
by open proxies, or help identify compromisedcomputers
within an organization.
Distinguishing between humans and robots based on
theirHTTPrequeststreamsis fundamentallydifcult,and
reminiscent of the Turing test. While the general prob-
lem may be intractable, we can make some observations
that are generally useful. First, we observe that most
Web browsers behave similarly, and these patterns can
be learned, whereas the behaviors of specialized robots
generally deviate from normal browsers. Second, the be-
havior of human users will be different from robots 
for example, human users will only follow visible links,
whereas crawlers may blindly follow all the links in a
page. Third, most human users browse Web pages using
the mouse or keyboard, whereas robots need not generate
mouse or keyboard activity. From these observations, we
propose two effective algorithms for distinguishing hu-
man activities from bots in real time: (1) human activity
detection, and (2) standard browser detection.
In our study, we test the effectiveness of these algo-
rithms on live data by instrumenting the CoDeeN open-
proxy-based content distribution network [9]. Our exper-
iments show that 95% of human users can be detected
within the rst 57 requests, 80% can be identied within
20 requests, and the maximum false positive rate is only
2.4%. Four months of running our algorithms in CoDeeN
indicates that our solution is effective, and reduces robot-
related abuse complaints by a factor of 10.
2 Approach
In this section, we describe how to identify human-
originated activity and how to detect the patterns exhib-
ited by Web browsers. We implement these techniques
in Web proxy servers for transparency, though they could
also be implemented in rewalls, servers, etc. We use the
term server in the rest of this paper to designate where
the detection is performed.
2.1 Human Activity Detection
The key insight behind this technique is that we can infer
that human users are behind the Web clients (or browsers)
when the server gets the evidence of mouse movement or
keyboard typing from the client. We detect this activity
by embedding custom JavaScript in the pages served to
the client. In particular, we take the following steps:<html>
...
<script language="javascript"
src="./index_0729395150.js"></script>
<body onmousemove="return f();">
<script>
function getuseragnt()
{ var agt = navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase();
agt = agt.replace(/ /g, "");
return agt;
}
document.write("<link rel=\’stylesheet\’"
+ "type=\’text/css\’"
+ "href=http://www.example.com/"
+ getuseragnt() + ">");
</script>
...
</body>
...
</html>
<!-- ./index_0729395150.js -->
var do_once = false;
function f()
{
if (do_once == false) {
var f_image = new Image();
do_once = true;
f_image.src = ’http://www.example.com/0729395160.jpg’;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Figure 1: Modied HTML and its linked JavaScript code. <script>...</script> and onmousmove=... is dynamically added in
the left HTML. The second <script>..</script> sends the client's browser agent string information back to the server.
1. When a client requests page `foo.html', the server
generates a random key, k 2 [0;:::;2128   1] and
records the tuple <foo.html, k> in a table indexed
by the client's IP address. The table holds multiple
entries per IP address.
2. The server dynamically modies `foo.html' and de-
livers it to the client. It includes JavaScript that
has an event handler for mouse movement or key
clicks. The event handler fetches a fake em-
bedded object whose URL contains k, such as
http:==example.com=foo html k.jpg. Suppose the
correct URL is U0. To prevent smart robots from
guessingU0 withoutrunningthe script, we obfuscate
the script with additional entries such that it contains
m(>0) similar functions that each requests U1, ...,
Um, where Ui replaces k with some other random
numberki(6= k). Addinglexicalobfuscationcanfur-
ther increase the difculty in deciphering the script.
3. When the human user moves the mouse or clicks a
key, the event handler is activated to fetch U0.
4. TheserverndstheentryfortheclientIP,andchecks
ifk intheURLmatches. Ifso, itclassiesthesession
as human. If the k does not match, or if no such
requests are made, it is classied as a robot. Any
robot that blindly fetches embedded objects will be
caught with a probability of m 1
m .
Figure 1 shows an example of dynamic HTML modi-
cation at www.example.com. For clarity of presentation,
the JavaScript code is not obfuscated. To prevent caching
the JavaScript le at the client browser,the server marksit
uncacheable by adding the response header line Cache-
Control: no-cache, no-store.
The sample code shows the mouse movement event
handlerinstalled at the <body>tag, but onecan use other
tags that can easily trigger the event handler, such as a
transparent image map (under the <area> tag) that cov-
ers the entire display area. Other mouse related events
such as mouseup and mousedown can also be used
as well as keyboard events. Alternatively, one can make
all the links in the page have a mouse click handler. For
example, the following code
<A HREF=somelink.html onclick=’’return f();’’>
Follow me</A>
will call the function f() when a human user clicks the
Follow me link. The function f() contains
f_image.src
=‘http://www.example.com/0729395160.jpg’;
which has the side effect of fetching the image, so the
server will receive the mouse movement evidence with k
= 0729395160 in the URL. The server can respond with
any JPEG image because the picture is not used. The pa-
rameterk intheURLpreventsreplayattacks, sotheserver
should choose k at random for each client/page.
The script below the <body> tag in Figure 1 sends
the client's browser string to the server. This embed-
ded JavaScript tells the server whether the client enables
JavaScript or not. If the client executes the code, but does
not generate the mouse event, the server can infer that it
is a robot capable of running the JavaScript code.
2.2 Browser Testing
In practice, a small fraction of users (4   6% in our
study) disable JavaScript on their browsers for security
or other reasons. To avoid penalizing such users, we em-
ploy browser detection techniques based on the browsing
patterns of common Web browsers. The basic idea be-
hind this scheme is that if the client's behavioral pattern
deviates from that of a typical browser such as IE, Fire-
fox, Mozilla, Safari, Netscape, Opera, etc., we assumeit comes from a robot. This can be considered a sim-
plied version of earlier robot detection techniques [6],
and allows us to make decisions on-line at data request
rates. Basically, we collect request information within a
session and try to determine whether a given request has
come from a standard browser. This provides an effective
measure without overburdening the server with excessive
memory consumption. An obvious candidate for browser
detection, the User-Agent HTTP request header, is eas-
ily forged, and we nd that it is commonlyforgedin prac-
tice. As a result, we ignore this eld.
On the other hand, we discover that many specialized
robots do not download certain embedded objects in the
page. Some Web crawlers request only HTML les, as
do email address collectors. Referrer spammers and click
fraud generators do not even need to care about the con-
tent of the requested pages. Of course, there are some ex-
ceptions like off-line browsers that download all the pos-
sible les for future display, but the goal-oriented robots
in general do not download presentation-related informa-
tion(e.g.,cascadingstylesheet (CSS) les, embeddedim-
ages), or JavaScript les because they do not need to dis-
play the page or execute the code.
We can use this informationto dynamically modify ob-
jects in pages and track their usage. For example, we can
dynamically embed an empty CSS le for each HTML
page and observe if the CSS le gets requested.
<LINK REL="stylesheet" TYPE="text/css"
HREF="http://www.example.com/2031464296.css">
Since CSS les are only used when rendering pages,
this technique can catch many special-purpose robots that
ignore presentation-related information. We can also use
silent audio les or 1-pixel transparent images for the
same purpose. Another related but inverse technique is
to place a hidden link in the HTML le that is not visible
to human users, and see if the link is fetched.
<A HREF="http://www.example.com/hidden.html">
<IMG SRC="http://www.example.com/transp_1x1.jpg">
</A>
Becausethe linkis placedona transparentimagewhich
is invisible to human users, humans should not fetch it.
However, some crawlers blindly follow all the links, in-
cluding the invisible ones.
3 Experimental Results
To evaluate the effectiveness of our techniques in a real
environment, we have implemented them in the CoDeeN
content distribution network [9]. CoDeeN consists of
400+ PlanetLab nodes and handles 20+ million requests
per day from around the world. Because CoDeeN nodes
look like open proxies, they unintentionally attract many
robots that seek to abuse the network using the anonymity
Description # of Sessions Percentage(%)
Downloaded CSS 268,952 28.9
Executed JavaScript 251,706 27.1
Mouse movement detected 207,368 22.3
Passed CAPTCHA test 84,924 9.1
Followed hidden links 9,323 1.0
Browser type mismatch 6,288 0.7
Total sessions 929,922 100.0
Table 1: CoDeeN Sessions between 1/6/06 and 1/13/06
provided by the infrastructure. While our previous work
on rate limiting and privilege separation [9] prevented
much abuse, we had to resort to manual pattern detection
and rule generation as robots grew more advanced.
3.1 Results from CoDeeN Experiments
We instrumented the CoDeeN proxies with our mecha-
nisms and collected data during a one-week period (Jan 6
- 13, 2006), with some metrics shown in Table 1. For this
analysis, we dene a session to be a stream of HTTP re-
quests and responses associated with a unique <IP, User-
Agent> pair, that has not been idle for more than an hour.
To reduce the noise, we only consider sessions that have
sent more than 10 requests.
Of the 929,922 sessions total, 28.9% retrieved the
empty CSS les we embedded, indicating that they may
have used standard browsers. On the other hand, we have
detectedmouse movementsin 22.3% of the total sessions,
indicating that they must have human users behind the IP
address. Considering that some users may have disabled
JavaScript on their browsers, this 22.3% effectively is a
lower bound for human sessions.
We can gain further insight by examining the sessions
that have executed the embedded JavaScript, but have not
shown any mouse movement  these denitely belong to
robots. We can calculate the human session set SH by:
SH = (SCSS [ SMM)   (SJS   SMM)
where SCSS are sessions that downloaded the CSS le,
SMM are sessions with mouse movement, and SJS are
sessions that executed the embedded JavaScript. We con-
sider the sessions with CSS downloads and mouse move-
ments to belong to human users except the ones that have
executed JavaScript without reporting mouse movement.
We label all other sessions as belonging to robots. Us-
ing the data collected from CoDeeN, we calculate that
225,220 sessions (24.2% of total sessions) belong to SH.
Note that the above equation gives us an upper bound
on the human session set because this set has been ob-
tained by removingfrom the possible human sessions any
that clearly belong to robot sessions. However, the dif-
ference between the lower bound (22.3%) and the up-
per bound (24.2%) is relatively tight, with the maximum
false positive rate(# of false positives/# of negatives) =
1.9%/77.7% = 2.4%. 0
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Figure 2: CDF of # of Requests Needed to Detect Humans
Our mouse detection scheme relies on the widespread
use of JavaScript among the users. To understand how
many users have disabled JavaScript on their browsers,
we employed a CAPTCHA test [8, 1] during the data col-
lection period. Users were given the option of solving
a CAPTCHA with an incentive of getting higher band-
width. We see that 9.1% of the total sessions passed the
CAPTCHA, and we consider these human users.1 Of
these sessions, 95.8% executed JavaScript, and 99.2% re-
trieved the CSS le. The difference (3.4%) are users who
have disabled JavaScript in their browsers, which is much
lower than previously reported numbers (10%). This
can explain the gap between the lower bound and the up-
per bound of human sessions in our experiment. We also
note that most standard browsers request CSS les, sug-
gesting that our algorithm based on CSS le downloads is
a good indicator for fast robot detection.
Figure 2 shows how many requests are needed for our
schemes to classify a session as human or robot. 80%
of the mouse event generating clients could be detected
within 20 requests, and 95% of them could be detected
within 57 requests. Of clients that downloaded the em-
bedded CSS le, 95% could be classied within 19 re-
quests and 99% in 48 requests. The clients who down-
loaded JavaScript les show similar characteristics to the
CSS le case. Thus, the standard browser testing is a
quick method to get results, while human activity detec-
tion will provide more accurate results provideda reason-
able amount of data. We revisit this issue in Section 4
when we discuss possible machine learning techniques.
3.2 Experience with CoDeeN’s Operation
During the four months this scheme has been deployed
in CoDeeN, we observed that the number of complaints
led against CoDeeN has decreased signicantly. Fig-
1While some CAPTCHA tests can be solved by character recogni-
tion, this one was optional, and active only for a short period. We saw
no abuse from clients passing the CAPTCHA test, strongly suggesting
they were human.
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Figure 3: # of CoDeeN Complaints Excluding False Alarms
ure 3 presents the number of complaints led against the
CoDeeN project in 2005. In February, we expanded the
deployment of CoDeeN on PlanetLab, from 100 US-only
nodes to over 300 total nodes worldwide. As CoDeeN
became widely used, the number of complaints started
to rise (peaking in July, when most of the complaints
were related to referrer spam and click fraud). In late
August, we deployed the standard browser test scheme
on CoDeeN, and enforced aggressive rate limiting on the
robot trafc. After we classify a session to belong to a
robot, we further analyzed its behavior (by checking CGI
request rate, GET request rate, error response codes, etc.),
and blocked its trafc as soon as its behavior deviated
from predened thresholds. After installing this mecha-
nism, we observed the number of complaints related to
robot activities have decreased dramatically, to only two
instances over four months. During this period, the other
complaints were related to hackers, who tried to exploit
new PHP or SQL vulnerabilities through CoDeeN. The
mouse movement detection mechanism was deployed in
January 2006, and we have not received any complaints
related to robots as of April 17th.
We also investigate how much additional overhead
these schemes impose, and we nd it quite acceptable.
A fake JavaScript code of size 1KB with simple obfusca-
tion is generated in 144 seconds on a machine with a 2
GHz Pentium 4 processor, which would contribute to lit-
tle additional delay in response. The bandwidth overhead
of fake JavaScript and CSS les comprise only 0.3% of
CoDeeN's total bandwidth.
4 Discussions and Future Work
In this section, we discuss limitations of our current sys-
tem and possible improvements using machine learning.
4.1 Limitations of Our Approach
Our proposed detection mechanism is not completely im-
mune to possible countermeasures by the attackers. A se-
rious hacker could implement a bot that could generate 90
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Figure 4: Machine Learning Performance to Detect Robots
mouseorkeystrokeeventsifheorshe knowsthata human
activity detection mechanism has been implemented by a
site. Although we are not aware of any such intelligent
bots today, we may need to address such issues in the fu-
ture. One possible way to address the problemis to utilize
a trusted underlying computer architecture to guarantee
that the events have been truly generated by the physical
devices [7]. A more practical solution may combine mul-
tiple approaches in a staged manner  making quick de-
cisions by fast analysis (e.g., standard browser test), then
perform a careful decision algorithm for boundary cases
(e.g., AI-based techniques). Our goal in this paper was to
design a fast and effective robot detection algorithm that
could be deployed in CoDeeN to effect practical benets,
whichwe seem to haveachieved. However,we do notfeel
the work is complete; on the contrary, it has just started.
4.2 Detection by Machine Learning
From the above discussion, the following question natu-
rally follows: How effective is a machine learning-based
technique, and what is the trade-off? The main forte of
machine learning is that if we can characterize the typi-
cal features of human browsing, we can easily detect un-
wanted trafc by robots. Conceivably, it is very hard to
make a bot that behaves exactly like a human.
To test the effectiveness of a detection algorithm us-
ing machine learning, we collected data by running
CAPTCHA tests on CoDeeN for two weeks, and classi-
ed 42,975 human sessions and 124,271 robot sessions
using 12 attributes shown in Table 2. We then divided
each set into a training set and a test set, using equal num-
bers of sessions drawn at random. We built eight clas-
siers at multiples of 20 requests, using the training set.
Forexample,theclassierat therequestnumber20means
that the classier is built calculating the attributes of the
rst 20 requests, and the 40-requestclassier uses the rst
40 requests, etc. We used AdaBoost [5] with 200 rounds.
Figure 4 shows the accuracy of classication with re-
spect to thenumberofrequests. Theresultshows the clas-
Attribute Explanation
HEAD % % of HEAD commands
HTML% % of HTML requests
IMAGE % % of Image(content type=image/*)
CGI % % of CGI requests
REFERRER % % of requests with referrer
UNSEEN REFERRER % % of requests with unvisited referrer
EMBEDDED OBJ % % of embedded object requests
LINK FOLLOWING % % of link requests
RESPCODE 2XX % % of response code 2XX
RESPCODE 3XX % % of response code 3XX
RESPCODE 4XX % % of response code 4XX
FAVICON % % of favicon.ico requests
Table 2: 12 Attributes used in AdaBoost
sication accuracy ranges from 91% to 95% with the test
set, and it improves as the classier sees more requests.
From our experiment, RESPCODE 3XX%, REFERRER
% andUNSEEN REFERRER % turnedout to be the most
contributingattributes. Basically, robotsdo not frequently
makerequeststhat result in redirection;manybotrequests
do not have a valid referrer header eld; and nally, refer-
rer spam bots frequently trip the unseen referrer trigger.
Althoughthis approachis promising, it has a few draw-
backs. First, it requires signicant amount of computa-
tion and memory, which may make the server susceptible
to DoS attacks. Second, in order to make accurate deci-
sions, it needs a relatively large number of requests, mak-
ing it difcult to apply in a real-time scenario (in our ex-
periment, it takes 160 requests to achieve 95% accuracy).
Third, the human browsing pattern may change with the
introduction of a new browser with novel features. Fi-
nally, attribute selection must be done carefully. In the-
ory, the learning algorithm can automatically determine
the most effective attributes, but in practice, bad choices
can decrease the effectiveness of the classier.
5 Related Work
Despite the potential signicance of the problem, there
has been relative little research in this area, and much of it
is not suitable for detecting the robots in disguise. For ex-
ample, Web robots are supposed to adhere to the robot
exclusion protocol [4], which species easily-identied
User-Agent elds, with contact information. Before
crawling a site, robots should also retrieve a le called
robots.txt, which contains the access permission of the
site dened by the site administrator. Unfortunately, this
protocol is entirely advisory, and malicious robots have
no incentive to follow it.
Tan et al. investigated the navigational pattern of Web
robots and applied a machine learning technique to ex-
clude robot traces from the Web access log of a Web
site [6]. They note that the navigational pattern of the
Web crawlers (e.g., type of pages requested, length of a
session, etc.) is different from that of human users, andthese patterns can be used to construct the features to be
used by a machine learning algorithm. However, their so-
lution is not adequate for real-time trafc analysis since it
requires a relatively large number of requests for accurate
detection. Robertson et al. tried to reduce administrators'
effort in handling the false positives from learning-based
anomalydetectionby proposingthe generalization(deriv-
ing anomaly signatures to group similar anomalies) and
characterization (to give concrete explanation on the type
of the attacks) techniques [3]. Using generalization, one
cangroupsimilar anomaliestogether,andcanquicklydis-
miss the whole group in the future if the group belongs to
false positives. In contrast to these approaches, our tech-
niquesaremuchsimplertoimplementyeteffectiveinpro-
ducing accurate results for incoming requests at real time.
Moreover, our proposed solution is robust since it does
not have any dependency on specic trafc models or be-
havior characterizations, which may need to change with
the introduction of more sophisticated robots.
CAPTCHA (CompletelyAutomatedPublicTuringtest
to tell Computers and Humans Apart) is a test consisting
of distorted images or sounds, sometimes with instructive
description, that are designed to be difcult for robots to
decipher [8]. These tests are frequently used by com-
mercial sites which allow only human entrance or limit
the number of accesses (e.g. concert ticket purchasing).
Kandula et al., used CAPTCHA tests to defend DDoS
attacks by compromised robots that mimic the behavior
of ash crowds [2]. They optimize the test serving strat-
egyto producebettergoodputduringthe attack. Although
CAPTCHA tests are generally regarded as a highly effec-
tive mechanism to block robots, it is impractical in our
scenario, since human users do not want to solve quiz ev-
ery time theyaccess a Web page. In comparison,our tech-
niques do not need explicit human interaction, and can be
used on every page, while producing highly accurate re-
sults. Also we are more concerned in providing a better
service under a normal operation rather than special situ-
ations such as during denial of service attacks.
6 Conclusion
While Web robots are an importantand indispensablepart
of the modernWeb, the subset of malicious robots poses a
signicant and growing concern for Web sites, proxy net-
works, and even large organizations. We believe the rst
step to deal with this is to accurately classify the trafc
source, and we present two novel techniques for discrim-
inating humans from robots.
Our experience with CoDeeN shows that our solution
is highly effective in identifying humans and robots. 95%
of humansare detected within 57 requests with less than a
2.4% false positive rate. The integration of the techniques
in CoDeeN's operation also greatly reduced the number
of abuse complaints caused by robots. Furthermore, we
believe that our solution is quite general  not only does it
applyto the safe deploymentof openproxies,but it can be
used to identify streams of robot trafc in a wide variety
of settings. We believe that this approach can be applied
both to individual Web sites, and to large organizations
tryingto identify compromisedmachines operatinginside
their networks.
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